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When the government subsidizes a commodity, it nor-
mally intends to promote production and/or consumption
of that commodity for either political, environmental, or
economic reasons. Today one major subsidy is the ethanol
program, currently with a $0.51 per gallon subsidy, which
will in the near future amount to a bill of over $3 billion
annually on 6 billion gallons of production.  This paper
investigates the effectiveness of the subsidy and asks
whether a cheaper alternative could be developed.
Like any government expenditure, the value of a sub-
sidy must be judged on how well it achieves its intended
objective – in this case, stimulating the production/con-
sumption of ethanol, and thereby increasing corn demand.
How well the objective is achieved can be measured by the
stimulus to production versus the cost to the government.
Stimulus to production should be tied to the effect of the
subsidy on expected profitability and the change in risk for
investors. 
A fixed subsidy could change the expected profitability
simply by adding to the expected profit without the sub-
sidy. However, if profit without the subsidy were already
high, as at present, the subsidy might have a small impact
on investment decisions and ethanol production. On the
other hand, a subsidy that was larger with lower ethanol
prices or higher input costs could reduce risk substantially
and stimulate greater production through that risk reduc-
tion. 
Today with ethanol prices near $3 per gallon, the
industry is very profitable without a subsidy, and the
added profit from the subsidy likely induces little addi-
tional investment. However, if wholesale gasoline and eth-
anol prices were to fall below $1 per gallon again, the sub-
sidy would provide substantial incentive for additional
investment. So, while we cannot predict the change in
investment for any given subsidy approach, we can esti-
mate the change in profitability and risk and compare that
with the government cost for each approach. 
The current ethanol subsidy is a flat 51 cents per gal-
lon of ethanol paid to the agent that blends ethanol with
gasoline. In the past it took the form of a partial or total
gasoline excise tax exemption, but today it is a tax credit
for the ethanol blender (Renewable Fuels Association,
2006). The subsidy is paid regardless of ethanol price or
production cost. 
It is possible to develop a subsidy that falls as the price
of ethanol increases and increases as the price of corn falls.
Here, we develop such a subsidy and compare it with the
current subsidy, examining the difference in government
cost, and ethanol producer risk and profitability with
monthly data from the past ten years. As shown below, we
find that government cost and ethanol producer risk is
always lower with the variable subsidy, and expected prof-
itability can be the same or lower compared to the fixed
subsidy, depending on one of the subsidy parameters. The
rest of this paper provides more details on the design of the
variable subsidy program and the empirical comparison.
Subsidy Design
In order to set up a variable subsidy, we need to examine
ethanol profitability under a wide range of corn and etha-
nol prices. Tiffany and Eidman's (2003) spreadsheet was
used to estimate profitability. Ethanol production uses
corn and generates byproducts and ethanol. That spread-
sheet model provides a profitability estimate given an etha-
nol price, a corn price, and a price for byproducts. One
item needed was a price for the main ethanol byproduct,
distillers dried grain with solubles (DDGS). DDGS can be
used in feeding to replace corn and soybean meal, and thus200 CHOICES 3rd Quarter 2006 • 21(3)
its price is highly correlated with
corn and soybean meal prices. Using
historic data, we estimated a relation-
ship between those prices that
explains 73% of the DDGS price
variability: 
DDGS Price = -9.205 + 1.037
(CornPrice) + .135 (SoyMealPrice), 
where all prices are dollars per ton. 
We then used the model to simu-
late profitability given corn and etha-
nol prices holding the soybean meal
price at $223.42 per ton. In turn, the
profitability data were used to esti-
mate the dependence of ethanol prof-
itability on corn and ethanol prices.
The results for profits per gallon pro-
duced are
Profits = -.723 + 1.00* EthanolPrice -
.243 * CornPrice,
where profits and ethanol price are in
units of $/gallon, and CornPrice is $/
bushel. The regression explains
almost all the variance in the data
(99.9%), which is a reflection of the
linear formulas involving these prices
in the spreadsheet. 
Next, we develop a variable sub-
sidy scheme. To do that, we intro-
duce a profit level per gallon in excess
of the standard 12% rate of return
assumed in the Tiffany/Eidman
model simulations (Profitpergallon),
and calculate the subsidy needed to
achieve that profit. The equation for
the subsidy then becomes: 
Subsidy = -.723 – Profitpergallon
+1.00EthanolPrice - .243CornPrice.
Converting the subsidy to a positive
value and rearranging terms, the sub-
sidy equation becomes:
Subsidy = Profitpergallon – (Ethanol-
Price - .723 - .243 * CornPrice). 
Thus, the subsidy is the difference
between the above-normal profit
level assumed (Profitspergallon) and
the returns from the market (ethanol
price less production costs). The vari-
able subsidy with this formulation is
constrained to be greater than or
equal to zero.
Magnitude of the Subsidy in the 
Formula
Table 1 provides the expected profit
from the Tiffany/Eidman model,
plus the profit under the current 51
cents per gallon fixed subsidy and the
variable subsidy (assuming the etha-
nol producer receives the entire sub-
sidy).1 If corn were $2.50/bu., etha-
nol $1.50/gal., and the specified
above normal profit (Profitpergal-
lon) 20 cents per gallon, then the
variable subsidy would be equal to 3
cents per gallon. In other words, a
subsidy of 3 cents per gallon is
required to maintain profitability at
1. It is unlikely that the ethanol pro-
ducer receives the entire subsidy, 
since there are other economic actors 
in the system.  However, there is no 
basis for calculating the share the 
ethanol producer receives.  In addi-
tion, there is no reason to believe 
that the share, whatever it is, would 
differ between the two systems.
 
Table 1. Expected ethanol profit under the two subsidy systems over a range of 
corn and ethanol prices.
Corn Price Ethanol Price




2.00 1.25 0.04 0.55 0.20
2.00 1.50 0.29 0.80 0.29
2.00 2.00 0.79 1.30 0.79
2.00 2.50 1.29 1.80 1.29
2.00 3.00 1.79 2.30 1.79
2.50 1.25 -0.08 0.43 0.20
2.50 1.50 0.17 0.68 0.20
2.50 2.00 0.67 1.18 0.67
2.50 2.50 1.17 1.68 1.17
2.50 3.00 1.67 2.18 1.67
3.00 1.25 -0.20 0.31 0.20
3.00 1.50 0.05 0.56 0.20
3.00 2.00 0.55 1.06 0.55
3.00 2.50 1.05 1.56 1.05
3.00 3.00 1.55 2.06 1.55
4.00 1.25 -0.45 0.07 0.20
4.00 1.50 -0.20 0.32 0.20
4.00 2.00 0.31 0.82 0.31
4.00 2.50 0.81 1.32 0.81
4.00 3.00 1.31 1.82 1.31
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Variable Subsidy with Alternative Levels 
of Profitpergallon
$0.20  $0.30 $0.38
Average producer profit/gallon $0.39 $0.21 $0.31 $0.39
Reduction in producer profit -46% -21% 0%
Variability of producer profit (CV) 0.43 0.34 0.23 0.18
Change in profit variability (CV) -21% -47% -58%
Government cost per gallon $0.51 $0.32 $0.42 $0.50
Change in government cost -37% -18% -2%
Note: CV is the standard deviation of profits divided by the mean.
20 cents above standard economic
return (assumed to be 12% on
equity). The subsidy could be much
higher. For example, if corn were
$4.00 and ethanol $1.25 like in
1996, and Profitpergallon = 0.20, the
subsidy would be 65 cents per gallon
– higher than the current subsidy.
Clearly, the variable subsidy reduces
private sector risk by stabilizing
returns. 
When Would We Have Zero 
Subsidies?
Figure 1 illustrates the combination
of corn and ethanol prices that result
in zero subsidy with the above stan-
dard return (Profitpergallon) set
equal to 20 cents per gallon and 38
cents per gallon. In Figure 1, any
combination of corn and ethanol
prices below the line will result in a
subsidy, with the amount depending
on corn and ethanol prices. Any
combination of corn and ethanol
prices on or above the line will result
in no subsidy. In the no subsidy zone,
a subsidy is not needed to maintain
ethanol profitability at the given 20
or 38 cents per gallon level, and any
subsidy provided by government is a
substantial, perhaps excess, payment
to producers.
Historical Comparison with the 
Fixed Subsidy
We also calculated private profitabil-
ity and government cost with the
variable and fixed subsidies using
data on corn and ethanol prices over
the past ten years. We did the analysis
using a subsidy that changed quar-
terly and was based on either ethanol
or gasoline prices. Table 2 summa-
rizes the results of this analysis for
different levels of above-standard
profit (Profitpergallon). 
The results show 
• The variable subsidy reduces gov-
ernment cost uniformly across
these data.
• The lower the value of Profitper-
gallon, the higher the cost savings
for the government and the lower
the expected profitability. 
• The variability in private sector
profitability (a measure of risk) as
measured by the coefficient of
variation (CV) of profit is always
lower with the variable subsidy as
compared with the fixed subsidy,
as would be expected. 
• Expected profitability is reduced
or held constant depending on
the value of Profitpergallon.
In other words, we can hold expected
profit and government cost about the
same and significantly reduce pro-
ducer risk, or we can lower expected
profit, government cost, and pro-
ducer risk all at the same time, but to
differing degrees. Figure 2 illustrates
the results of this analysis with Profit-
pergallon set at 20 cents and Figure 3
with Profitpergallon equal 38 cents. 
Concluding Comments
In 2007, ethanol production may be
about 6 billion gallons. With the cur-
rent fixed subsidy, the cost to the
government of the ethanol subsidy
will be at least $3 billion (6 billion
gallons times the 51 cent per gallon
subsidy). With the variable subsidy,
and under current market prices for
gasoline, ethanol, and corn, the vari-
able subsidy cost would be zero, sav-
ing the government over $3 billion.







































Figure 1. Locus of zero subsidy ethanol and corn prices.202 CHOICES 3rd Quarter 2006 • 21(3)
would have in place a mechanism to
guarantee against any future adverse
changes in corn or ethanol prices. 
The variable subsidy clearly offers
advantages over the current fixed
subsidy. In our model, the additional
profitability parameter, Profitpergal-
lon, can be viewed as a political
choice variable. The higher one sets
Profitpergallon, the higher the indus-
try profitability, the higher govern-
ment cost, and the lower private sec-
tor risk. Under no circumstance was
the variable subsidy more costly than
the fixed subsidy over this historic
period. To the extent there is a trade-
off between expected profitability
and risk reduction (that is, producers
would give up some profit to lower
risk), the government would be able
to set Profitpergallon low enough to
reduce expected government costs
and substantially reduce private sec-
tor risk at the same time – a clear
win-win. In a few years, the expected
production of ethanol will be 8 bil-
lion gallons or more. The annual cost
to the government with the fixed
subsidy would be $4.08 billion. If oil
prices remain high, the variable sub-
sidy would cost nothing, but would
provide a safety net for ethanol pro-
ducers.
As described above, this variable
subsidy would apply only to corn-
based ethanol. This mechanism
would need to be applied to a limited
volume of corn ethanol or gradually
converted to a subsidy that varies
with gasoline prices alone. A different
mechanism would need to be devel-
oped for cellulose-based ethanol and
bio-diesel, probably based on gaso-
line and diesel prices. The point is
that it would be relatively easy to
extend the corn-based variable sub-
sidy to the other products.
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Figure 2. Fixed and variable subsidy profitability (Profitpergallon = 20 cents).
Figure 3. Fixed and variable subsidy profitability (Profitpergallon = 38 cents).